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Abstract
We model capital accumulation in a dynamic New-Keynesian model with
staggered price setting à la Calvo. It is assumed that ﬁrms do not have access
to a rental market for capital. We compare our model with an alternative
speciﬁcation where households accumulate capital and rent it to ﬁrms. The
diﬀerence in implied equilibrium dynamics is large, as we justify by proposing
a simple metric. This result invites us to interpret some of the puzzling
empirical ﬁndings that have been obtained using models with staggered price
setting and a rental market for capital as an artefact of this particular set of
assumptions.
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11 Introduction
In the ﬁeld of New-Keynesian macroeconomics there has been recent interest in
models with staggered price setting that allow for capital accumulation.1 The main
reason is that many research questions can only be addressed if capital accumulation
is taken into account.2 Moreover, it has been argued that modeling investment
demand might help explain some empirical regularities once additional features are
introduced into the model, which would be hard to entertain if consumption was
the only component of aggregate demand.3 However, it is unclear ap r i o r ihow
capital accumulation should be introduced into such a model. As has been argued
by Woodford (2003, Ch. 5), combining the assumptions of staggered price setting
and a rental market for capital is convenient but potentially unappealing: it aﬀects
the determination of the marginal cost at the ﬁrm level in a non-trivial way. Our
understanding of New-Keynesian models with staggered price setting and capital
accumulation is therefore obscured as long as the quantitative consequences of the
widely used rental market assumption remain opaque.
The present paper ﬁlls that gap in the existing literature: the rental market case
is compared with a baseline model where we assume that ﬁrms make investment
decisions, and importantly, that they do not have access to a rental market for capi-
tal.4 In both models we assume staggered price setting à la Calvo and the following
(standard) restrictions on capital formation: the additional capital resulting from
an investment decision becomes productive with a one period delay, and there is a
convex adjustment cost in the process of capital accumulation. The two models are
compared in a simulation exercise where we analyze the respective impulse responses
1For an early New-Keynesian model, which allows for capital accumulation see, e.g., Yun (1996).
2See, e.g., Galí et al. (2003). The authors consider rule-of-thumb consumers in addition to
optimizing consumers. They argue that the distinction between the two groups is only meaningful
if capital accumulation is introduced explicitly into the model.
3Christiano et al. (2001) and Smets and Wouters (2003) use the assumption of investment
adjustment costs and show that it generates a hump shaped output response after a monetary
policy shock. Edge (2000) introduces time-to-build capital combined with investment adjustment
costs into a Calvo style sticky price model. She shows that these assumptions help generating a
liquidity eﬀect.
4The baseline model has been analyzed by Sveen and Weinke (2004). There we show that the
price setting problem in the presence of an investment decision at the ﬁrm level has not been solved
in a correct way by Woodford (2003, Ch. 5).
2to a shock in the exogenous growth rate of money balances.
Our main ﬁnding is the following: for any given restriction on price adjustment
there is a substantial amount of additional price stickiness in the baseline model
compared with the rental market speciﬁcation. We justify this claim by proposing
a metric, which gives a precise quantitative meaning to it. The intuition behind
our result is plain from a comparison of the price setters in the two models: with
a restriction on capital adjustment at the ﬁrm level, as in the baseline model, an
increase in a ﬁrm’s price is associated with a decrease in its marginal cost.5 We refer
to this feature of the baseline model as short run decreasing returns to scale. This
eﬀect is absent if a rental market for capital is assumed. The latter implies that
each ﬁrm in the economy faces the same marginal cost, which is independent of the
quantity supplied by any individual ﬁrm. This mechanism has been discussed by
Sbordone (2001) and Galí et al. (2001) for models with decreasing returns to scale
resulting from a ﬁxed capital stock at the ﬁrm level.6 Our work shows that short
run decreasing returns to scale in the baseline model suﬃce to imply equilibrium
dynamics that are quantitatively diﬀerent from the ones associated with the rental
market speciﬁcation. The diﬀerent price setting incentives in the two models are
indeed the driving force behind our result: the only diﬀerence between the two
models lies in the characterization of the respective inﬂation dynamics.7 As we will
see, this theoretical result invites us to interpret some of the puzzling empirical
ﬁndings that have been obtained using models with staggered price setting and a
rental market for capital as an artefact of this particular set of assumptions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 outlines the baseline
model and the rental market speciﬁcation. In Section 3 we conduct the abovemen-
tioned simulation exercise. Section 4 concludes.
5In the baseline model we assume that the capital stock at the ﬁrm level is predetermined and
that there exists a capital adjustment cost. One of the two assumptions would suﬃce to imply
that a ﬁrm’s price setting decision aﬀects its marginal cost. The role of a predetermined capital
stock at the ﬁrm level per se, i.e. abstracting from capital adjustment costs, has been analyzed by
Sveen and Weinke (2003).
6See Woodford (1996) for an early model with diﬀerences in marginal costs among producers.
7The latter holds up to the ﬁrst order approximation to the equilibrium dynamics, which we
are going to consider later on.
32 The Model Economy
There are three types of agents: households, a perfectly competitive ﬁnal good
producer, and monopolistically competitive intermediate goods producers. The only
source of aggregate uncertainty in the model economy comes from the growth rate
of money balances, which we assume to follow an AR(1) process:
∆mt = ρm∆mt−1 + εt, (1)
where mt ≡ logMt,w i t hMt denoting time t nominal money balances. The para-
meter ρm is assumed to be strictly positive and less than one, and εt is iid with zero
mean and variance σ2
ε.
2.1 Households





kU (Ct+k,N t+k), (2)
where β is the household’s discount factor, Ct is consumption of the ﬁnal good, and












where parameters σ and φ are positive. The former is the household’s relative risk
aversion, or equivalently, the inverse of the household’s intertemporal elasticity of
substitution. The latter can be interpreted as the inverse of the Frisch aggregate
labor supply elasticity. Moreover, we assume that households have access to a
complete set of contingent claims and that the labor market is perfectly competitive.
The household’s problem is subject to the following sequence of budget con-
straints:
PtCt + Et {Qt,t+1Dt+1} ≤ Dt + WtNt + Tt, (4)
where Pt is the time t price of the ﬁnal good, and Wt is the nominal wage as of
4that period. Moreover, Dt+1 is the nominal payoﬀ of the portfolio held at the end
of period t, Qt,t+1 i st h es t o c h a s t i cd i s c o u n tf a c t o rf o rr a n d o mn o m i n a lp a y m e n t s ,
and Tt denotes proﬁts resulting from ownership of ﬁrms. This structure implies the


















The ﬁrst equation is the optimality condition for labor supply, and the second is
a standard intertemporal optimality condition. The time t price of a risk-less one-
period bond is given by R
−1
t = EtQt,t+1,w i t hRt denoting the gross nominal interest
rate as of that period. Later on, we will follow Galí (2000) and assume a standard
demand for real balances in addition to the household’s structural equations.
2.2 Firms
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive ﬁrms8 indexed on the unit
interval. These ﬁrms produce diﬀerentiated intermediate goods. The latter are used
as inputs by a perfectly competitive ﬁrm producing a single ﬁnal good.
2.2.1 Final Good Firm













where Yt is time t production of the ﬁnal good, Y d
t (i) is the quantity of intermediate
goodi used as an input, and ε is a parameter strictly greater than one. The latter can
be interpreted as the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods. Proﬁt
maximization by the ﬁnal good producer implies the following demand for each
8Monopolistic competition rationalizes the assumption that a ﬁrm is willing to satisfy unex-
pected increases in demand even when a constraint not to change its price is binding. See, e.g.,




















2.2.2 Intermediate Goods Firms
Intermediate goods ﬁrms set prices and make investment decisions with the objective
of maximizing the values of their dividend streams.9 Each ﬁrm i ∈ [0,1] is assumed to




where α ∈ [0,1) is a constant, Kt (i) denotes ﬁrm i’s capital stock in period t,a n d
Nt (i) is the amount of labor used by that ﬁrm in its time t production of output
denoted Yt (i).
The feature of price staggering is introduced into the model by invoking the Calvo
(1983) assumption, i.e. each ﬁrm is allowed to change its price in any given period
with a constant and exogenous probability, which is common to all ﬁrms. This
way we capture the fact that ﬁrms change prices only infrequently. Moreover, each
ﬁrm makes an investment decision at any point in time. There is a convex capital
adjustment cost and the additional capital resulting from an investment decision
becomes productive with a one period delay. Next we consider price setting and
investment decison making in more detail.
Price Setting A price setter i takes into account that the choice of its time
t nominal price, P∗
t (i),m i g h ta ﬀect not only current but also future proﬁts. The






t (i) − µMCt+k (i)]} =0 , (11)
9See the Appendix for a formal statement of the intermediate goods ﬁrms’ price setting and
investment problems.
6where θ denotes the probability that an intermediate goods ﬁrm is not allowed to
change its price, µ ≡ ε
ε−1 is the frictionless mark-up, and MCt (i) is ﬁrm i’s nominal





where MPLt (i) denotes ﬁrm i’s marginal product of labor at time t.
Equation (11) takes the form of the standard ﬁrst order condition for price setting
in the Calvo model: the price is chosen in such a way that a weighted average of
current and future expected marginal proﬁts is equalized to zero. However, since
a ﬁrm’s capital stock is among the determinants of its marginal product of labor,
we cannot solve the price setting problem without considering the ﬁrm’s investment
behavior. We turn to this next.
Investment Behavior Given ﬁrm i’s time t capital stock Kt(i) the quantity
of the ﬁnal good It(i) that needs to be purchased by that ﬁrm in order to have a







where I(·) is an increasing and convex function. The latter is consistent with the
existence of a convex capital adjustment cost. Moreover, we follow Woodford (2003,
Ch. 5) in assuming I(1) = δ, I0(1) = 1,a n dI00(1) =  ψ,w h e r eδ is the depreciation
rate and the parameter  ψ > 0 measures the capital adjustment cost in a log-linear
approximation to the equilibrium dynamics.
The ﬁrst order condition associated with ﬁrm i’s time t investment decision is













where MSt+1(i) denotes the nominal marginal savings in ﬁrm i’s labor cost at time






where MPKt+1(i) denotes ﬁrm i’s marginal product of capital at time t +1 .
Equation (14) takes a standard form.10 It is noteworthy, however, that a ﬁrm’s
marginal return to capital is measured by the marginal savings in its labor cost,
as opposed to its marginal revenue product of capital. As has been emphasized
by Woodford (2003, Ch. 5), ﬁrms are demand constrained. This implies that the
return from having an additional unit of capital in place derives from the fact that
this allows to produce the quantity that happens to be demanded using less labor.
When forming the time t expectation of MSt+1(i), an optimizing ﬁrm i takes
rationally into account that its time t+1price, Pt+1(i), might be optimally chosen in
period t+1. The reason is that MSt+1(i) depends on ﬁrm i’s demand at time t+1,
which is a function of its relative price as of that period. Sveen and Weinke (2004)
show that this aspect of a ﬁrm’s investment behavior has important consequences
for its price setting decision: it implies that the latter depends, to some extent, on
expected future optimally chosen prices. This has been overlooked by Woodford
(2003, Ch. 5).11 We come back to this point later on when characterizing the
inﬂation dynamics associated with the baseline model.
2.3 Market Clearing
Clearing of the labor market, the intermediate goods markets, and the ﬁnal good








Yt = Ct + It, (18)
where It ≡
R 1
0 It (i)di. Moreover, it is useful to deﬁne aggregate capital for all t:
10For a short discussion, see Sveen and Weinke (2004).





Finally, we deﬁne the following auxiliary variable:





It is easy to see that the diﬀerence between Yt in (7) and e Yt in (20) is of the second
order. Hence, we can safely ignore it for the purpose of a log-linear approximation
to the equilibrium dynamics. We turn to this next.
2.4 Some Linearized Equilibrium Conditions
We consider a log-linear approximation to the equilibrium dynamics around a sym-
metric steady state with zero inﬂation. Throughout, a hat on a variable denotes the
percent deviation of the original variable with respect to its steady state value. We
start by collecting some standard equilibrium conditions, while leaving the charac-
terization of the inﬂation dynamics for the next paragraph.
2.4.1 Households
Taking conditional expectations on both sides of (6) and log-linearizing yields the
household’s Euler equation:
b Ct = Et b Ct+1 −
1
σ
(it − Etπt+1 − ρ), (21)






t h er a t eo fi n ﬂation as of that period. Moreover, ρ ≡−logβ is the time discount
rate. Equation (21) reﬂects the household’s incentive to smooth consumption.






= φ b Nt + σ b Ct. (22)






= b Yt − η(it − ρ), (23)
where η denotes the semi-elasticity of the demand for real balances with respect to
the nominal interest rate.
2.4.2 Firms
We obtain the law of motion of capital from averaging investment decisions. Our
starting point is the log-linearized real marginal savings in the labor cost of an
intermediate goods ﬁrm i:
c mst(i)=c mst −
ε
1 − α
b pt (i) −
1
1 − α
b kt (i), (24)
where pt (i) ≡
Pt(i)
Pt is ﬁrm i’s relative price, and kt (i) ≡
Kt(i)
Kt denotes ﬁrm i’s relative
to average capital stock at time t. Finally, mst denotes the average real marginal







where MPLt and MPKt denote, respectively, the average time t marginal product
of labor and capital. They are obtained from equation (20).
Log-linearizing the ﬁrst order condition for investment (14), averaging over all
intermediate goods ﬁrms12, and invoking (21) and (24), we obtain the following law







Et b Kt+2 (26)
+
1 − β(1 − δ)
 ψ (1 + β)
Etc mst+1 −
1
 ψ (1 + β)
(it − Etπt+1 − ρ).
Assuming a capital adjustment cost implies that capital is a forward-looking variable.
12Note that the ﬁrst order condition associated with the investment decision takes the same
functional form irrespective of whether a ﬁrm is allowed or restricted to change its price.
102.4.3 Market Clearing
Log-linearizing the ﬁnal good market clearing condition (18) yields:
b Yt =






b Kt+1 − (1 − δ) b Kt
i
. (27)
Moreover, log-linearizing equation (20) and recalling that the diﬀerence between Yt
in (7) and e Yt in (20) is of the second order results in:
b Yt = α b Kt +( 1− α) b Nt. (28)
The last equation is the log-linearized aggregate production function.
2.5 Linearized Price Setting
In order to characterize the inﬂation dynamics associated with the baseline model, we
average and aggregate price setting decisions in the way discussed below. A natural
starting point is the real marginal cost at the ﬁrm level, denoted mct (i) ≡
MCt(i)
Pt .
Log-linearizing the latter yields:
c mct (i)=c mct −
εα
1 − α
b pt (i) −
α
1 − α
b kt (i), (29)






We refer to b kt (i) as ﬁrm i’s capital gap at time t. The intuition behind equation (29)
is the following: the relative price term is exactly as in Sbordone (2001) and Galí et
al. (2001) for models with decreasing returns to scale and labor as the only variable
productive input. As they discuss, ceteris paribus,a ni n c r e a s ei naﬁrm’s relative
price is associated with a decrease in its marginal cost. The reason is an increase
in the ﬁrm’s marginal product of labor resulting from a decrease in its supply for a
ﬁxed capital stock. The role of the capital gap term has been discussed by Sveen
and Weinke (2004): ceteris paribus,a ni n c r e a s ei naﬁrm’s capital stock is associated
11with a decrease in its marginal cost. The reason is that for a ﬁxed supply a ﬁrm’s
marginal product of labor increases with the capital stock it uses in production.



















k Etb kt+k (i), (31)
where ξ ≡
(1−βθ)(1−α)
1−α+εα ,a n dψ ≡
(1−βθ)α
1−α+εα.13 The last equation shows that, in addition
to the standard inﬂation and average marginal cost terms, a ﬁrm’s optimal price
setting decision does also depend on its current and future expected capital gaps
over the expected lifetime of the chosen price.
As we show in Sveen and Weinke (2004), the relevant capital gap terms in equa-
tion (31) are aﬀected by ﬁrm i’s time t expectation of its future optimally chosen
prices.14 This aspect of a ﬁrm’s price setting decision has been overlooked by Wood-
ford (2003, Ch. 5).
The problem of characterizing the resulting inﬂation dynamics is intricate. How-
e v e r ,i nS v e e na n dW e i n k e( 2 0 0 4 )w es h o wt h a tat r a c t a b l ea p p r o x i m a t i o nc a nb e
obtained without any sizeable loss of accuracy. The basic idea is to use the follow-
ing property of the model: in steady state, all ﬁrms choose to hold the same capital
stock. Therefore, a price setter takes rationally into account that it will eventually
close its capital gap. Our strategy is to go through the following steps: in the ﬁrst
step we assume that price setters expect a zero capital gap already one period af-
ter the price setting decision is made. In the next step price setters expect that it
takes two periods until their capital gaps are closed. We keep going. At each step
an inﬂation equation is obtained from averaging and aggregating the price setting
decisions. Finally, we assess numerically the quantitative consequences of using the
diﬀerent inﬂation equations associated with the steps. Surprisingly, it turns out that
13The price setting problem is stated in terms of variables that are constant in the steady state.
14This is the crucial conceptual diﬀerence with respect to the speciﬁcation where a rental market
for capital is assumed. In the latter case all of a ﬁrm’s future expected relative prices that are
relevant for a price setting decision can be obtained from combining the current optimally chosen
price of that ﬁrm with the expectation of future changes in the aggregate price level.
12the equilibrium dynamics are almost identical at each step.15 This justiﬁes the use
of the following simple inﬂation equation, which can easily be obtained from the
ﬁrst step:
πt = βEtπt+1 + κc mct, (32)
where κ =
ξ(1−θ)
θ . Our intuition for why future expected capital gaps aﬀect price
setting decisions so little is based on the forward-looking nature of investment de-
cision making in the presence of a capital adjustment cost: if the relevant planning
horizon for the investment decision is long enough then price setters and non-price
setters do not make (on average) very diﬀerent investment decisions since they face
the same probabilities of being allowed or restricted to adjust prices in the future.
This completes our characterization of the relevant equilibrium conditions for
t h eb a s e l i n em o d e l .
2.6 The Model with a Rental Market for Capital
We assume that a representative household accumulates the capital stock and rents
it to intermediate goods ﬁrms. The household maximizes the objective function
given in (2) subject to the following sequences of constraints:
Pt (Ct + It)+Et {Qt,t+1Dt+1} ≤ Dt + WtNt + R
k








t denotes the time t rental rate of capital. Hence, Rk
tKt is the income that
accrues to the household in period t for renting the capital stock Kt. PtIt denotes
nominal expenditure on investment.
The ﬁrst order conditions associated with the household’s choices over leisure and
the time path of consumption are identical to the ones given in equations (5) and (6),
















15This result is remarkably robust with respect to the chosen calibration. For a discussion of the
accuracy of the approximation, see Sveen and Weinke (2004).
13Cost minimization implies that each ﬁrm produces at the same capital labor
ratio. The marginal cost is therefore common to all ﬁr m s ,a n dt h i sa l l o w su st o







Log-linearizing equation (35) and invoking (21) we recover the same log-linearized
law of motion of capital as the one given in equation (26). This means that, up
to a log-linear approximation to the equilibrium dynamics, the set of equilibrium
conditions is identical to the one associated with the baseline model, except for
the inﬂation equation: with a rental market for capital a ﬁrm’s marginal cost is
independent of its price setting decision. The resulting inﬂa t i o ne q u a t i o nt a k e st h e
following standard form:
πt = βEtπt+1 + λc mct, (37)
where λ ≡
(1−βθ)(1−θ)
θ , and the average marginal cost is deﬁn e di nt h es a m ew a ya s
in the baseline model.16
3 Simulation Results
As we have already noted, the inﬂation equation is the only structural equation that
takes a diﬀerent form depending on whether or not a rental market for capital is
assumed. This means that, given the speciﬁcation of monetary policy in (1), the
equilibrium processes for the nominal interest rate, consumption, real wage, real
balances, capital, output, hours, and inﬂation are determined by equations (21),
(22), (23), (26), (27), (28), and an inﬂation equation. The latter is given by equation
(32) for the baseline model and by equation (37) for the rental market speciﬁcation.
For both models the average marginal cost is given by equation (30). The average
marginal savings in labor costs and the rental rate of capital are obtained from
equations (25) and (36), respectively.17
16See Galí (2003) et al. for a detailed development of a Calvo type model with a rental market
for capital.
17To solve the dynamic stochastic system of equations we use Dynare
(http://www.cepremap.cnrs.fr/dynare/).
143.1 Baseline Calibration
The period length is one quarter. Assuming σ =2is consistent with empirical
estimates of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.18 We set φ =1 , implying a
unit labor supply elasticity. Our choice η =1implies an empirically plausible value
of about 0.05 for the interest rate elasicity. We assign a standard value of 0.36 to
the capital share in the production function, α. Setting β =0 .99 implies an average
annual real return of about 4 percent. Assuming θ =0 .75 means that the average
lifetime of a price is equal to one year. We choose ρm =0 .5 and σ2
ε =0 .1, which is in
line with the empirical evidence on the autoregressive process for M1 in the United
States.19 Consistent with a frictionless markup of 10 percent, we choose ε =1 1 .20
Finally, we set  ψ =3 .21
3.2 Results
We analyze impulse responses associated with a positive one standard deviation
shock to the growth rate of money balances. We compare the baseline model with
an alternative speciﬁcation where ﬁrms have access to a rental market for capital.
We ﬁnd that the inﬂation response to the shock is relatively smaller on impact in
the baseline model. However, it becomes eventually larger than the corresponding
level in the rental market speciﬁcation. Moreover, the output reaction is larger
in the baseline model both on impact and during the transition. This is shown
in Figure 1. The intuition is as follows: to the extent that prices are sticky a
positive monetary policy shock aﬀects real interest rates and stimulates aggregate
demand. This implies an increase in current and future expected marginal costs.
Without a rental market for capital a price setter is more reluctant to change its
price in response to the shock. The reason is that the ﬁrm takes into account that its
marginal cost is aﬀected, to some extent, by the chosen price: due to the restrictions
on a ﬁrm’s capital adjustment a price increase is associated with a decrease in its
marginal cost. This eﬀect is absent if a rental market for capital is assumed. In
18See, e.g., Basu and Kimball (2003) and the references herein.
19Our calibration of φ, α, β, θ, ρm, and σ2
ε is justiﬁed in Galí (2000) and the references herein.
20This is consistent with the empirical estimate in Galí et al. (2001).
21This value is justiﬁed in Woodford (2003, Ch. 5) and the references herein.






















Figure 1: Inﬂation and output response to a monetary policy shock in the baseline
model compared with the rental market speciﬁcation.
that case each ﬁrm produces at the same marginal cost, which is independent of
the quantity an individual ﬁrm supplies. This means that for any given restriction
on price adjustment there is additional price stickiness in the baseline model with
respect to the rental market speciﬁcation.
In order to assess if the diﬀerences between the two models are quantitatively
important we construct a simple metric, which is based on the following observation:
it is possible to reproduce the impulse responses associated with the baseline model
if we increase the degree of price stickiness in the model with a rental market for
capital.22 We ﬁnd that the diﬀerences in the impulse responses shown in Figure 1
a r ea si m p o r t a n ta sac h a n g ei nt h ea v e r a g ee x p e c t e dl i f e t i m eo fap r i c ef r o m4t o
about 10 quarters in the rental market model. Recently, it has been argued (on
intuitive grounds) that the assumption of a rental market for capital in a Calvo
style sticky price model might be problematic because the researcher who uses such
22For the abovementioned reasons we restrict attention to the simple inﬂation equation (32) in the
baseline model. This implies that the price stickiness parameter in the rental market speciﬁcation
c a nb ea d j u s t e di ns u c haw a yt h a tw er e c o v e rexactly the same equilibrium dynamics as in the
baseline case. The value is θ =0 .9007, if the other parameters are held at their baseline values.




























Figure 2: Relationship between the metric and parameters ε and α.
a model for empirical analysis would tend to overestimate the degree of price stick-
iness. For instance, Smets and Wouters (2003) amend their empirical analysis with
a caveat of this kind. Their estimate of the expected lifetime of a price is two and
a half years, which is far fetched. Our theoretical result shows that this somewhat
puzzling ﬁnding might reﬂect the quantitative consequences of the rental market
assumption. Our result sheds also light on a ﬁnding by Christiano et al. (2001).
Their empirical estimate of the price stickiness parameter in a Calvo style model
with capital accumulation and a rental market is ‘driven to unity’. They claim that
this is an unappealing feature of sticky price models. However, we tend to interpret
their ﬁnding as an artefact of the rental market assumption.23
Of course, the adjustment of the price stickiness parameter that is needed in
the rental market model in order to generate the same equilibrium dynamics as in
the baseline model depends on the calibration. This is shown in Figure 2. First, if
the elasticity of substitution between goods, ε, increases then a price setter is more
23It should be noticed, however, that both Smets and Wouters (2003) and Christiano et al.
(2001) assume an investment adjustment cost combined with other features that are not present
in the models we compare in the present paper.
17reluctant to change its price in the baseline model. The reason is that a higher value
of ε implies that a ﬁrm’s price setting decision has a stronger impact on its marginal
cost. Therefore, more price stickiness is needed in the rental market model in order
to make the two impulse responses coincide. This is shown in the upper panel of
Figure 2. Second, an increase in the capital share in the production function, α,
has a similar eﬀect: it increases the price setters’ reluctance to change their prices
in the baseline model. As is shown in the lower panel of Figure 2, the latter implies
that more price stickiness is needed in the rental market model in order to generate
t h es a m ee q u i l i b r i u md y n a m i c sa si nt h eb a s e l i n em o d e l .
4C o n c l u s i o n
We should emphasize the main contribution of our paper and some of the issues
that are left for future research. We analyze New-Keynesian models with staggered
price setting à la Calvo and a convex adjustment cost in the process of capital ac-
cumulation. In the baseline model it is assumed that ﬁrms do not have access to a
rental market for capital. We compare this model with an alternative speciﬁcation
where a rental market is assumed. Our main ﬁnding is that the diﬀerence in implied
equilibrium dynamics is large and we propose a metric, which gives a precise quanti-
tative meaning to that statement. This theoretical result sheds light on some of the
puzzling empirical ﬁndings that have been obtained using New-Keynesian models
with staggered price setting and a rental market for capital.
Clearly, our model is very simplistic and lacks many aspects that seem to be
relevant for investment decisions by ﬁrms in the real economy. A natural extension
is to introduce convex adjustment costs in investment into the model developed so
far. The latter will help producing empirically desirable features like a hump shaped
output response to a monetary policy shock. The model presented in this paper is
not capable of producing this pattern. However, we conjecture that our main result
is robust as long as some restriction on capital accumulation is introduced into the
model: the widely used assumption of a rental market for capital does not appear
to be innocuous in a model with staggered price setting.
18Appendix: Price Setting and Investment

































t+k+1(i) with prob. 1 − θ
Pt+k(i) with prob. θ,
Kt (i) given.
Using the expressions for a ﬁrm’s nominal marginal cost and the real marginal
savings in its labor cost given in equations (12) and (15), respectively, it follows that
P∗
t (i) and Kt+1(i) must satisfy the ﬁrst order conditions given in equations (11) and
(14), respectively. A ﬁrm j that is restricted to change its price at time t solves the
same problem, except for the fact that it takes Pt(j) as given.
24We use the notation and the deﬁnitions that have already been introduced in the main text.
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